LEADERSHIP ON THE CHINA COAST

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CONTENTS

Contributors vi

Preface vii

1 Introduction
   Göran Aljmer 1

2 Rural Leadership in the Hong Kong Region:
   Village autonomy in a traditional setting
   James W. Hayes 32

3 Leaders, Factions and Ethnicity in Sai Kung
   C. Fred Blake 53

4 Macao: Legal Fiction and Gunboat Diplomacy
   Anthony R. Dicks 90

5 The Dilemma of Political Middlemen:
   Leadership in a rural commune during socialist
   transformations
   Helen F. Siu 129

References 166
never have had their analogies in reality'. Freedman himself, of course, was aware of this possibility showing itself when a body of good historical and field material on south-east China had been built up, and was typically provocative in suggesting such a model in the presence of slender material on the basis that 'it may explain much because it knows so little'. (Freedman 1958:133).

25 Paradoxically, it also caused disputes within lineages where conduct was thought to be unethical or to harm others, by intent or accident. Such cases are plentiful in local families of long settlement. I hope to write about these on a later occasion.

26 When the new Civil and Criminal Codes were being elaborated by the Kuomint’ang Government, the place of local custom in the matter of irrigation and other rights was much in its mind. The Introduction to the Civil Code states (p.xvi): 'It was the wish of the Commission that many traditional agricultural customs, which had grown out of the geographical or economic conditions of particular districts, should be preserved so long as they were not contrary to public or good morals'. It is noteworthy that the articles of the Civil Code in this and related matters (for water rights see: Articles 775-785) provide that local custom shall have precedence over the Code if there be a difference in provision. See the English translations of The Civil Code of the Republic of China and The Criminal Code of the Republic of China (1931, 1936). Article 252 of the Criminal Code makes the impairment of farm irrigation an offence punishable by imprisonment, detention or fine.

27 Where no sources are cited, the text is based on information obtained from old inhabitants, some of whom knew Cheung Kwong-Chuen and Kung Pong-tsai personally, and from documents in Chinese relating to the land and money transactions of these two men and those of the third, Chan Fushing, that have been made available to me through the kindness of their present owners to whom I am much indebted for their courtesy and co-operation. I am also grateful for help with translation, especially to Mr. Chan Kwun-ngok, and for the ready help of many Lantau residents with my inquiries.
analysis (cf. Skinner 1964-5), we can see that factions had adaptive value in two ways. Factions were adaptive in terms of the success and failure of leaders to preside over the development of Sai Kung market. Success was contingent on three emergent criteria to be discussed later in conclusion. These included the leader's ability to mobilize political power on the local level by manipulating combinations of local interests, especially the various speech groups since no set of agnostic organizations was ever powerful enough to control access to the market area. The other criteria were the leader's ability to organize a base of commercial power and to support the British colonial presence. The factional success of four leaders since 1950 therefore depended on how well each managed these three factors in relating the divisive local microcosms with the penetrative imperial macrorosms. Factions were adaptive in a second way: Each leader sought to institutionalize his benevolence and influence by organizing 'voluntary associations'. Although factions are unincorporated conflict groups, Chinese 'voluntary associations' are usually presented as the corporate basis of community welfare and stability - and anthropological descriptions of 'structure'. In the hitherto undifferentiated market of Sai Kung we can see how a skeleton of associations emerged out of the disintegration of lineage-village society through the process of factionalism: Thus by viewing factions in an historical and regional framework we can appreciate their adaptive value in the development of urban and overseas-type Chinese communities.

Sai Kung Market: A Hakka Enclave in the Cantonese Arena

Sai Kung is neither 'overseas' nor 'Chinese' proper. The situation is peculiar to Hong Kong. It is similar to 'overseas' communities in so far as the polity is colonized and the economy is strictly laissez-faire, i.e. the free pursuit of commercial spoil and its distribution is held to be the basis for prestige and power. As in overseas communities Sai Kung is heterogeneous in surname, lineage organization and speech-group identity.

On the other hand, Sai Kung became an indigenous Chinese market situated on a mountainous peninsula of some 73 square miles east of the old walled city of Kowloon. Before the establishment of Hong Kong, Sai Kung was the south-east leg of the Cantonese-dominated Sham Chun and Tai Po marketing system. From the seventeenth century several thousand Tung Kuan County Cantonese emigrants occupied the most fertile agricultural land in the three largest valleys around Sai

Leaders, Factions and Ethnicity

Kung - then just a small village. Topographically, Sai Kung was very different from the flat fertile lands of the Cantonese delta. Sai Kung was part of agriculturally poor and hilly eastern Kwangtung, an area dotted by hamlets of Hakka-speaking people. With the rise of the Hong Kong entrepôt and the inter-necine clan wars between Cantonese and Hakka in Kwangtung and Kwangsi during the nineteenth century, Hakka refugees and traders began filling in the hills and narrow gulleys around Sai Kung. By the end of the century they numbered about six-and-a-half thousand. The women eked out a marginal subsistence of potatoes and rice, while their men took advantage of the opportunities for trade between Hong Kong and the Fao-an coast. These tabile modes of livelihood combined with the strategic position of Sai Kung on the flank of a burgeoning seaport made the area spawning grounds for secret societies, piracy and smuggling.

Sai Kung was so remote from imperial authority and was of such small scale that leadership was exercised essentially through local lineage, village and 'secret' organizations. Sai Kung leaders were not the wealthy, educated cosmopolitans found in Singapore and Bangkok, nor the sophisticated gentry of rural China. They were schooled in the rough and tumble trade of the south China coast in which almost all of them were 'self-made from scratch' to use Skinner's (1958) term.

At this time the population of Sai Kung was organized in about one hundred lineage-hamlets in 17 'villages' (hsiang) representing about 35 surnames. With the establishment of British control over the area called the 'New Territories' in 1898, Sai Kung became a Hakka marketing enclave separate from the Cantonese-dominated market at Tai Po. In place of the tremendous diversity of surnames and small-scale lineages, the Hakka promoted local solidarity on the basis of their speech group identity. Anyone wanting to participate in local political economy had to accommodate Hakka speech and customs. The slogan 'Hakka fathers impressed upon their sons - 'If you don't speak Hakka, you will eat none of my rice!' - was extended to persons doing business in the market.

Immigrant traders, shopkeepers and even local Cantonese villagers procured Hakka wives who provided the tenuous alliance between the Hakka majority and the Cantonese minority. However, Cantonese were the overwhelming majority in the Hong Kong region, and only within their little marketing enclave did Hakka 'feel their gall'. Outside Sai Kung 'Bakka' was a derogatory word; even today it carries the stigma in urban Hong Kong of 'country bumpkin!' In the company of outsiders, Sai Kung Hakka are extremely desirous of being able to veil their Hakka identity by speaking impeccable Cantonese.
Leaders, Fractions and Ethnicity

The Japanese Occupation and the Hakka Resistance

By 1940, Sai Kung market was becoming a thriving trade centre at the edge of the Hong Kong entrepôt. The shopkeepers decided to form a Chamber of Commerce to articulate their interests in the region vis-à-vis the Colonial Government. In many urban Chinese communities, the Chamber of Commerce is the highest level of community integration. However, before Sai Kung shopkeepers could petition for government recognition, the Japanese attacked Hong Kong.

During the Japanese occupation, Sai Kung became an area of resistance. The Hakka East River Column infiltrated about a hundred Communist partisans into Sai Kung and recruited about two hundred local villagers. They rooted out traitors, Japanese police spies and other uncooperative elements, surveyed Japanese military installations in Kowloon, imposed and enforced a code of conduct, staged patriotic performances, distributed rice, oil and sugar to the starving population, smuggled strategic supplies out of Hong Kong and aided escaping allied soldiers and civilians to Free China.

The Japanese countered the guerrillas by imposing curfews, executing 'bandits', expelling non-natives and drafting villagers to build a military road from Kowloon to Sai Kung market. There they established a 'Sai Kung Self-Administrative Association' (Tsu-chi Hui). Two primary functions of this organ were to manage the ration of Japanese-controlled rice and to gather intelligence on the 'Communist bandits'. Each village selected a chief to sit on the council in the market town, and he was responsible to the Japanese Commandant for economic and military security in his district. Many of the older village leaders declined to assume such awesome responsibilities. Their positions fell to the younger ambitious men. These young leaders confronted the problem of protecting fellow villagers from starvation, massacre or assassination by playing off the outside interests, the Japanese and the guerrillas. On the surface the Association was 'collaborationist'; it provided the Japanese with security. Inside, however, the circles of local leaders provided the Communist guerrillas with intelligence. The Self-Administrators maintained local order for the Japanese Commandant but on terms largely dictated by the guerrillas! In this deprived and static environment local factions could hardly emerge.

The British restoration of Sai Kung (1945) was accommodated by the guerrilla retreat to Haichow. However, as the intensifying Civil War on the mainland began to threaten the security of the colony, the British decided to continue the Japanese system of rural representation. In 1947 they organized the Rural Committee system in order to maintain rural security and local hegemony. Each of the 91 hamlets in nine
hsiang of the immediate market area sent representatives to sit in the general assembly. Each was selected in traditional style from among the village 'big-men'. In the market town, each street was similarly represented. Every two years the general assembly elected a twenty-one member executive committee which had no statutory powers but acted with considerable influence vis-à-vis the British District Officer in organizing the development of Sai Kung. This established the political base for factionalism.

At the same time, the economic basis for factionalism was established in the organization of Sai Kung migrant labour to the phosphate mines of Mauku Island in the early fifties and in the commercialization of Sai Kung land later in the decade.

The Chin Fuk-Loi Faction (1941-1960) and the Hakka Hegemony

Chin Fuk-Loi seemed eminently qualified to preside over post-war Sai Kung. His resistance credentials were more than the local Hakka as well as the British. Chin had come from a poor Hakka hamlet to Sai Kung market in the late 1920s where he had engaged his considerable talent in the lucrative organization of gambling. During the resistance he had been the leader of the Self Administration Association. In this position he had covered guerrillas and smugglers, among whom he counted relatives and friends. Near the end of the occupation, the Japanese accused Chin of subversion and interrogated him with water torture.

By 1950, Chin's clientele included rural Hakka villagers with whom he had survived the Japanese invasion and town merchants through whose ranks he had risen. As Sai Kung men left their land for overseas wage-labour after the years of deprivation, refugees from the People's Republic of China began pressing on Hong Kong for living, commercial and industrial space. In offering himself as a local leader, Chin grasped the opportunity to manage the outside demands for migrant labour and for local land investments.

Chin's main leg of support were Hakka affines and agnates. For example, a young village leader named Lim was related to Chin through marriage. After the occupation many of the Lim villagers left for overseas wage-labour. They placed their paddy-fields in Lim's trust. Lim brought as much land as he could. Then he sold the land to Chin, and Chin in turn sold the land to outside speculators. The Lim ancestral lands which were increasing in commercial value were alienated through a network of agnatic, affinal and mercantile relationships. In this way Lim sacrificed the solidarity of his lineage and village and maximized his factional solidarity which included a coterie of shopkeepers in the market. By
Leaders, Factions and Ethnicity

1960 Lim had managed to open a shop in the market and had traded his position of village leader to become a street leader.

The other leg of Chin's support was Chan Yat-Kuan. Chan was a young Cantonese merchant. He was bent on organizing a following partisan to the Communist cause in China. The differences between Chin and Chan in terms of age, kinship and speech group, not to mention personality, provided the basis for their political alliance. In fact, Chin was rather like an uncle to Chan. Conveniently, their surnames, though pronounced differently in Hakka and Cantonese, were written with the same character. Thus their written surname transcended their speech-group difference. In fact the two men invested in joint land holdings as if they were members of the same family, yet neither relied on the solidarity of his own lineage for factional support.

A large part of Chin Fuk-Loi's support was based on Chan Yat-Kuan's clientele. While Chin drew upon his rural Hakka connections such as Lim, Chan reached into the Cantonese villages. Chan obtained a large tract of land from a local Cantonese village chief named Wong Mo. Chan thereupon built a commercial pig farm and rented the rest to Cantonese refugees. Similar to Lim, Wong Mo sacrificed his clan lands and obtained a small business foothold in the market as a close confidant of Chan Yat-Kuan.

Cantonese Villagers form the Native Fellowship Association

By 1952 Chin Fuk-Loi had consolidated his position as Chairman of the rural committee with Chan Yat-Kuan as his vice-Chairman. Chin's first organized opposition came from a Cantonese villager named Liao. Liao might have taken advantage of discontented Hakka villagers who were not part of the Chin faction but lacked the credentials to lead them. While most Hakka villagers had supported the great Hong Kong and Canton Seamen's strike of 1928, Liao had sided with foreign management. Also Liao had administered the Japanese rice ration programme and had not emerged from the occupation with the same credibility as Chin. This was all in keeping with the fact that Liao never attained fluency in the dominant local tongue of Hakka; instead he prided himself on the refinement of his Cantonese and literary education, especially his ability to speak and write a smattering of English. But he even lacked influence among Cantonese villagers since most patronized Chan Yat-Kuan who was in turn like a nephew to Chin Fuk-Loi. Most importantly, however, Liao was not schooled in the tough tradition of local trade, and consequently he never attained a scale of wealth and patronage necessary to lead a faction.
Liao's English ability gave him a certain unofficial access to the District Officer. Liao attempted to use his channel of influence to oppose the Rural Committee projects such as the expansion of the market town's public school. In 1953, Liao decided to form a Sai Kung District Native Fellowship association (Tung-hsing Hui). It was open to all persons 'born in the district of Sai Kung'. In his appeal to the District Officer for recognition, he argued the necessity for this benevolent association to establish a medical clinic. The District Officer interpreted Liao's Association as blatant factionalism and refused recognition on the grounds that it duplicated the Rural Committee and robbed it of prestige.

After months of protracted negotiation, the District Officer agreed to register Liao's Fellowship Association as a 'social club'. The District Officer thereafter refused further recognition and assistance, and the Association languished in the hands of Liao and a handful of disgruntled landlords until its takeover by the Hakka in 1960.

Sai Kung Rural Order shifts into Urban Gear

In 1960, the old Japanese military road was widened and paved thus facilitating commercial integration of Sai Kung into urban Kowloon. To the Sai Kung resources of migrant labour and land speculation were added food producers and luxury consumers. During the first years of the decade over 8,000 'outsiders', including Communist and Kuomintang partisans, Cantonese, Hakka and Teochiu refugees, sojourners and boatpeople, descended on Sai Kung. The influx almost doubled the population, but it was somewhat offset by the continuing emigration of Sai Kung-born men with their British passports to more lucrative labour markets abroad.

Among the largest aggregates was the Teochiu from around the port of Swatow (see note 2). They rented fallow paddy from the Cantonese villagers to grow vegetables and raise pigs for the Kowloon market. A few Teochiu who could speak Hakka had already established themselves in Sai Kung market, and by the early 1960s they had entered the trade in bakery goods and rice. After 1960, they began paving the way for many more of their Teochiu brethren into Sai Kung. Their phenomenal success, due to mutual aid, hard work and low profits coupled with the support of their powerful parent association in Kowloon, was bitterly resented by the local people. However, as we shall see, the Teochiu were a group whose commercial power had to be reckoned with.

The Cantonese boat-people were another organized category who began to yield commercial power in Sai Kung after 1960. The boat population grew from several hundred to several thousand, and the fresh fish trade, previously miniscule, expanded to a daily trade of 100 piculs (about 14,000 pounds). With the help of the Hong Kong Government, the boatpeople mechanized their boats, organized six credit and marketing co-operatives and established a wholesale fish market in Sai Kung town. Such was their earning power that these once impoverished outcasts of Chinese society became an integral cog controlling a third of the local market economy. However, the boatpeople participation in the local economy was complementary rather than competitive. While the Teochiu competed directly with the local farmers and shopkeepers for space, clientele and prestige, the boatpeople by virtue of their special niche worked to expand production and consumption in the local economy.

Thus Chan Yat-Kuan, whose family business became dependent on the boatpeople's patronage, as did that of many other merchants, encouraged the Rural Committee to revise its constitution to provide for the selection of seven boatpeople's representatives to sit in the General Assembly. The boatpeople were thus included in the Chan faction, and the Teochiu, as Teochiu at least, remained on the outside.

While the social and economic landscape was traumatized, developed and enriched by outsiders, the Rural Committee was disrupted by the sudden 'resignation' of Chairman Chin in January 1961. Actually he was dismissed from office, but the Colonial Government did not publicize its accusations, for it had recently decorated Chin for his gallant service in the Resistance. Ironically, his dismissal by the British was analogous to his dismissal by the Japanese. Through his 'benevolence' he was providing persons born in China with Sai Kung identities thus undermining the security of British control.

Chin Fuk-Loi attempted to save part of his prestige by retaining the leadership of Sai Kung Chamber of Commerce (Shang Hui). However, the Chamber of Commerce had never been registered by the Hong Kong Government. Chin's faction immediately petitioned the Government for official recognition in order to accommodate Chin's dismissal from the Rural Committee. In the next few years, however, Chin Fuk-Loi and Chan Yat-Kuan dissolved their joint land holdings. By 1963 when the Chamber was finally registered Chan himself had become the Executive Secretary (Li-shih Chang). The Chamber provided a whole new array of prestige positions for Chan's little town.
Chairman Chan (1960-1967): Cantonese Shopkeepers Organize Sai Kung Market

While the Colonial Government rid itself of Chin, whose loyalty was too local, Chan Yat-Kuan's loyalty to Sai Kung society would prove even more profound. Vice Chairman Chan was barely thirty years old when he assumed the Chairmanship of the Rural Committee. He was gregarious and unusually intelligent. He was also more subtle in his manner of influence. Of Sai Kung's leaders, he was the least 'local' and the least 'self-made' - which may account for his over-compensation of local loyalties.

His great grandfather had sojourned from a rich village in Hsin-hui and set up a store in Sai Kung market prior to the turn of the century. During the Japanese occupation the whole lineage repaired to their native village in Hsin-hui. When they returned to Sai Kung in 1945, Chan Yat-Kuan and his eighth uncle, Chan Yung-Sin, actively supported the Communist movement in China. Their partisanship was not shared by other members of the lineage; nevertheless, the death of the lineage founder embroiled the uncle and nephew in a bitter dispute over the division of the estate. Chan Yat-Kuan and Chan Yung-Sin, although agnates only a year apart in age and sharing ideological proclivities, became political opponents in the local struggle for influence and prestige.

It began with the election to fill Chin's chair in the Rural Committee. Chan Yung-Sin sought to have himself elected chairman, but Chan Yat-Kuan, with a decade of dedicated organizing, had almost all the votes in the executive on his side. Eighth uncle Yung-Sin won only his own vote.

Although Chan Yat-Kuan was Cantonese, he spoke Hakka fluently. He headed a powerful patriotic faction in which many of his clients were Hakka veterans of the 1946 Communist effort to hold a base area along the East River in Kowchow. As many as a hundred local Hakka villagers had actively engaged in the fighting and many had never returned home. After 1946, Sai Kung became a refuge for persons fleeing the Kuomintang encirclement of the East River Column. Chan helped numerous 'refugees' of the civil disorders in China to obtain vegetable and pig farms in the Cantonese village near the town where he had established his own farm. In town he provided access to shop space; he gave introductions to the China State Banks in Kowloon to secure credit; he helped to organize tours to Canton for local shopkeepers; he brought films from China for evening viewing in the public school playground; and he helped to introduce patriotic curricula in the public school.

In the same year that Chan assumed formal leadership of the district, he obtained official recognition for his base of power in the market by establishing the Kaifong or Neighbourhood Association (Chieh-fang Chih-il Hui) (Wong 1972). Because of the increasing heterogeneity of the town population, informal procedures of selecting representatives were proving difficult. The Kaifong Association incorporated the town residents and provided formal procedures for electing twenty-one street representatives to the Rural Committee. Another motive for the Kaifong Association was to reassert the market town prestige and leadership in local affairs.

The merchants with their commercial wealth had always constituted the informal basis for local leadership. Their influence had been undercut by the new system of rural representation in which each small hamlet had an equal vote in local affairs. Under the Rural Committee, shopkeepers felt reduced to their ceremonial duties of caring for the local deities. Chan's registration of the Kaifong Association did not diminish the power of the Rural Committee, but it did provide another array of offices for his clientele, and it gave him more control over this body of wealthy representatives.

The traditional function of the Sai Kung shopkeepers to care for the local deities was no mean burden; it was very much a part of mobilizing public sentiment and political power. People remembered a leader in terms of how well he organized and financed the town's religious festivities. This was one important way that a leader redistributed his wealth. No other leader is remembered so well in this respect as Chan Yat-Kuan. When the Hong Kong Government-sponsored Temple Committee attempted to assume trusteeship of Sai Kung's Tin Hau Temple to ensure the temple's preservation by the collection of entrance fees, Chan resisted their actions as a vulgar attack on Sai Kung's religious traditions. He argued that Sai Kung temples must remain free for the local religious supplicants. The Sai Kung Tin Hau was not an artifact for tourism; rather, it symbolized the vitality and integrity of local Chinese culture. Chan's resistance was successful, and the Tin Hau Temple remained in the trust of local leaders. In 1965 Chan organized and made the largest contribution to the first reconstruction of the Tin Hau Temple since 1915.

The Ho-Chin faction (1960-1974): The village Hakka Resurgence

As Chan's Cantonese-led faction was consolidated and normalized in the colourful trappings of local Hakka traditions and National patriotism, other would-be leaders began forming an opposition. They were Hakka villagers who were establishing businesses in the town. Their leadership nucleus was two men from neighbouring Hakka hamlets, Ho Yen-Pai and Chin Shu-Siak, a nephew of Chin Fuk-Loi.
Ho had been an 'independent guerrilla'. He had occupied a key position in the guerrilla organization, but he was a 'Protestant', not a Communist. After the occupation he reopened his father's small grocery store in the market. During the Japanese occupation, Chin Siu-Siak had smuggled strategic supplies out of Hong Kong. Following the British restoration Chin Siu-Siak continued his trade between Hong Kong and Waichow. But after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, China's cargo included persons fleeing from the Communists. China's wealthiest client was a Mei-Hsiu Hakka. Chin and Ho helped him to establish a restaurant in Sai Kung market, which became the centre for their faction.

Ho and Chin's strategy entailed capturing the inactive Fellowship Association since it claimed to uphold native village interests. In 1960 Ho, the Hakka and ex-guerrilla quartermaster, displaced the Cantonese executive, Liao, who had been the quartermaster for the Japanese. Ho was not only a shopkeeper who could outspend Liao, the villagers, but Ho was a Hakka with resistance credits and credentials which Liao, the Cantonese 'collaborator' lacked. In the same way Chin Siu-Siak and other Hakka villagers also won executive positions. The Association membership was originally composed of five Cantonese and five Hakka, but by 1962 there were eighty members, overwhelmingly village Hakka. Shortly before the 1962 election of the leaders of the Fellowship Association including 29 Hakka and only six Cantonese members signed an official protest to the District Officer:

The Rural Committee, originally for the benefit of the villagers, should be publically nominated from the elders of the villages who are familiar with the local feelings and customs and who have been here for a century or so. The existing members of the Rural Committee consist of those who have lived here between three and ten years and who know nothing about the local customs... Their characters are different and so are their views... The most improper thing is that Sai Kung market, a small speck in this area, occupies the most seats in this Rural Committee.

However, the protest had no influence on the District Officer. Only seven of the signatures were village chiefs, and besides, the Fellowship Association was considered an obstructionist lot of factitious fellows.

Ho and Chin turned their attention to the 218-member Chamber of Commerce which had the political legitimacy and financial base that the Fellowship Association lacked. The Chamber was controlled by shopkeepers who were by and large loyal to Chan.

Leaders, Factions and Ethnicity

Yat-Kuan. Of the fourteen executive members, six were Hakka and eight were Cantonese, including Chan, his father and two uncles. In addition three of the Hakka executives were related to Chan by marriage. Nevertheless in the 1963 Chamber election, Ho Yen-Pai was elected executive secretary. Chan Yung-Sin, who collaborated with the faction opposed to his nephew, was elected second secretary. Chin Siu-Siak was elected third secretary. Chan Yat-Kuan, his father and a father's brother were not re-elected. Now the Hakka 'villagers' under Ho and Chin dominated the Chamber leadership in a ratio of two to one!

It is not clear whether Chan Yat-Kuan thought merely to appease the opposition by allowing them to win the leading offices in the Chamber or if he simply didn't consider the expense worthwhile since the real power was already locked up in his Kafong and Rural Committee Executive. However it was soon evident that the Ho-Chin opposition would be satisfied with nothing less than control of the Rural Committee.

Among the most lucrative items for which local merchants began competing after 1960 were the franchises to retail the consumer products of large corporations. These franchises were usually controlled by the chairman of the Rural Committee, since he enjoyed the closest association with the drug agencies. Chairman Chan had the franchises to retail American products such as petrol and kerosene as well as China State products. However, Chin Siu-Siak obtained the franchise to market tobacco and spirits of the American Tobacco Company. When the company was informed that Chin was smuggling their products into Macao, the franchise was transferred to Chan Yat-Kuan... Chan accused Chin of informing on him to outsiders, a serious allegation in local circles. Chin's political aims, originally spurred by a long-smouldering ambition, now were inflamed by revenge.

Taking aim directly at the Rural Committee Chin drafted a letter to the District Officer which 47 of the 218 members of the Chamber signed. The letter requested 'improvement in the way in which the (Rural Committee) elections will be conducted...'. The letter alleged that Chan's market faction unfairly and illegally controlled the Rural Committee elections. It further complained that non-propertied outsiders, and worshippers of local deities and ancestors had taken over the town and were trying to exclude local property owners and 'Christians' (reference pertaining mostly to 'Protestants' such as Ho) from the Rural Committee. There was no mention in Chin's protest that Chan's market faction was 'leftist' or 'Communist' or 'Cantonese', although this was no secret in the town or in the District Office. Such facts would not have impressed the District Officer before 1967.
Leaders, Factions and Ethnicity

Chan reclaims the Chamber of Commerce in Alliance with Kuomingtang Loyalists

It is now clear to Chairman Chan that the Chamber was led by uncompromising opponents, such as Chin Siu-Siak. Chan mobilized his father, father's brother and other faction fellows for the 1965 Chamber of Commerce election. One of these was his second vice-chairman, Lo Man-Yi, chief of the Cantonese village west of town.

The Lo lineage was the one real exception to the general disintegration of lineage-village solidarities. They maintained agnatic solidarity by organizing the distribution of 'relief' from Taiwan and the U.S. to their fellow villagers. Although some of the 'relief' was normally channelled through the Rural Committee, Chan, the Communist partisan, was 'embarrassed' to accept it, and simply left it for his Kuomingtang allies to use for their own purposes.

The Los always garnered enough Cantonese village votes to place a vice-chairman on the Rural Committee; but because of their rural rather than commercial base, they were never able to elect a Chairman. They did not speak Hakka and had but a small clientele among the surrounding Hakka villagers. Instead, the Los sought to profit from the rental of their village lands to Teochiu commercial farmers. But by 1965, these Teochiu tenants were organizing their entrance into the commerce of the market town, and the Teochiu were accomplishing this by switching their patronage from the Los to the Ho-Chin faction who were attempting to take over the town.

In this case, the competition between Hakka and Cantonese for Teochiu clients encouraged the alliance between Communist partisan, Chan Yat-Kuan, and the Kuomingtang loyalist, Lo Man-Yi, on the basis of their Cantonese identity and antipathy toward the Ho-Chin Hakka and Teochiu alliance.

Thus, in support of Chairman Chan’s election to head the Chamber of Commerce, Lo Man-Yi used his influence on the electorate from his district. Chin Siu-Siak's faction alleged that Lo collected the ballots from the Chamber members in his valley and cast them in favour of the Chan faction. In the 1965 elections for the Chamber of Commerce executive, Chin's defeat was crushing, and only the events unfolding in Peking would bring him to the pinnacle of power in Sai Kung market.

The 1967 Upheaval of Sai Kung Market

The year 1967 was another seminal one in the annals of this little town. That summer the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China reached its climax. In Canton it was 'the most disorderly summer since the Communist rise to power'
(Vogel 1969:133). The disorders spilled across the Sham Chun River into the politically volatile colony of Hong Kong. What was originally some kind of large-scale 'rectification campaign' in China was unwittingly changed into an amorphous 'upheaval' (in Communist parlance) or 'disturbance' (in Colonial rhetoric). In Hong Kong it took on more 'patriotic' overtones - the very united front mentality of Liu Shao Ch'i that was under attack in China.

The urban areas of Kowloon and Hong Kong erupted in industrial strikes, patriotic demonstrations and bloody meles with police. Focusing on police brutalities, the leaders of the Chinese national establishment (bankers, publishers and merchants) mobilized popular sentiment and money to form a number of illegal 'Anti-Persecution Struggle Committees' (You Wei Hui).

On the morning of 30 May 1967, at a meeting of the New Territories Hung Yee Kuk (The Rural Consultative Council) of Rural Committee Chairmen, Chan Yat-Kuan delivered a tirade against the repressive measures of the Hong Kong Government. Two days later at a meeting of The Rural Committee in Sai Kung, he and his first vice-chairman announced the formation of the Sai Kung District Struggle Committee. Six of the thirteen Rural Committee executives and seven representatives joined the rebellion. They became leaders of the Struggle Committee. All spoke fluent Hakka, although only half of them were local Hakka. Four were local Cantonese and two were Teochiu shopkeepers. A large number of the general Rural Committee membership complied with this initial action. Many assumed China was about to rectify one of its most glaring international contradictions - the existence of a British colony on its soil.

The partisan leaders articulated three new categories which previously had not been organized in Sai Kung: workers, youth and women, the ideological backbone of the Chinese revolution. Under the general Struggle Committee, a Shop Assistants and Hawkers Struggle Committee was formed a few weeks later. It was led by the two Teochiu executives who had been shop assistants in Chan's father's store before they opened their own grocery and sundries shops.

Shortly thereafter a Sai Kung Youth Struggle Committee was officially launched by two Hakka men. One was an old villager who had been active in the 1925 Hong Kong and Canton Seamen's strike and later in the guerrilla resistance against the Japanese. The other was a middle-aged immigrant from Waichow, a veteran Communist guerrilla, who now lived on the outskirts of Sai Kung market. He was a taxi driver, and the chauffeur for Chairman Chan. He persuaded other drivers to strike and contribute to the struggle fund. Under these officials were a number of active youth leaders, including two middle-aged Hakka teachers from the market and an unemployed teacher from a Cantonese village. Under their direction were a number of mostly Hakka male and female secondary school students.

Finally, the Sai Kung Women's Struggle Committee, the third branch of the Struggle Committee, was organized by three women. One was a middle-aged lady in the town who had never married. The second was an elderly woman who managed a grocery store in town and who had been deserted by her husband. The third was the middle-aged Mrs. Chan Yat-Kuan, the Struggle Committee's leading activists included about twenty female and male students, nine shopkeepers, three villagers (small landowners and sojourners), two ex-seamen, two truck and cab drivers, and two teachers. Typically, teachers and drivers (and other unorganized workers) were the most radical and sustained the largest number of arrests. The shopkeepers, landowners and ex-seamen (who had the wisdom gained in a long history of organized struggle) tended to occupy formal positions of leadership exercising restraints on the radical activists.

In August the colonial government officially dismissed Chan and his First Vice-chairman from their positions in the Rural Committee. Lo Man-Yi, the Second Vice-chairman did not actively join the rebellion and retreated to his village to ride out the storm. Chan appealed against his dismissal to the Governor of Hong Kong, but he was unsuccessful as the strikes and boycotts in early summer moved into the leftists' bombing campaign in later summer and further polarized the two sides. The police then arrested the First Vice-chairman. Chan and other leaders fled the market to hide in remote Hakka villages where guerrilla partisans had operated two decades Previously. In this network of mountain villages they moved every few days and held political meetings.

While the Committee exercised its leadership from these remote villages, the more daring and radical youth organized a variety of small 'fighting groups' and 'cultural work teams' modelled on the Red Guard. They demonstrated, printed leaflets, plastered big character posters on public buildings, made and delivered real and fake bombs, edited and distributed broadsheets, and staged patriotic cultural performances. All of these activities were severely penalized under the Hong Kong Government Emergency Acts. In these ways the young activists attempted to mobilize student boycotts of their classes and merchant boycotts of Western products and customers in accord with the colony-wide general strike which had been organized on 10 June. Besides playing cat and mouse with the police, these groups harassed the handful of uncooperative teachers and missionaries who at times ventured to go to market.
In October, the police raided an abandoned village school which the radicals had taken over. The police found twenty bombs with powerful explosives being manufactured there. The next day the radical youth retaliated by marching into a new public school in the same village, assaulting a teacher, smashing the Queen's portrait, and plastering the walls with posters. A few days later they plastered the outer walls of the Kaifong school with their broadsheets. These intermittent attacks and counter-attacks continued through the autumn of 1967.15

The Sai Kung Struggle Committee had a general membership of over 200 persons. The speech group composition of the 124 that I have identified consisted of 90 Hakka, 28 Cantonese and 6 Teochiu. The three largest categories by ethnicity, residence, age and sex were all local Hakka: village men (32), village young men (18), market town women (9) and market town men (8). These categories characterized the membership of the Struggle Committee in contrast to the Public Security Advancement Association which was formed to oppose the radicals.

The Reassertion of Imperial Control: Chin Mobilizes the Public Security Association

When the Rural Committee collapsed the District Officer lost his political, if not police, control over Sai Kung. He immediately devised plans to re-establish his authority. Perhaps the obvious thing for him to do was to allow the Kuomintang elements to organize the local opposition to the Communists. But this idea was never seriously considered since it was the fervent belief of the Hong Kong Government that the People's Republic had no intention of taking over unless the colony became a base for Kuomintang organization.

The District Officer needed a leader who was not anathema to local patriotic sentiment but who also supported the British colonial presence. There were a number of such persons, but none were willing formally to articulate the Government's interests on the local level. For instance, the District Officer considered asking Chan Yat-Kuan's uncle, Yung-Sin, to chair a new Rural Committee. Yung-Sin's initial support of Liu Shao-Chi and his reluctance to play along with the radicals was well known, but his membership in the Struggle Committee was constrained by his business connection with the Chinese State establishment in Hong Kong, and he literally could not afford actively to support the Government.

In late June 1967, the District Officer finally appealed to the 'responsible men' of the Fellowship Association to form a Public Security Advancement Association (Min-an Ts'u-chin Hui) (hereafter PSAA) to counter the leftist grass-roots organiz-

Leaders, Factions and Ethnicity

ation. At last the District Officer was ready to grant the men of the Fellowship Association all the official recognition and prestige that he had in the past denied. While Ho Yen-Fai was more circumspect in his willingness to do the Government's bidding at this point, Chin Siu-Siak boldly offered to lead the PSAA.

Many of those who took up positions in the PSAA were of small but rising means. They reasoned that if Hong Kong did revert to China, they stood to lose little in comparison with what they had gained; but if Hong Kong remained under British control they would gain. As land prices fell, they invested; when the British community and some of the Chinese élite were beleaguered, they gave their support through the activities of the PSAA.

The organization's constitutional purposes were: (1) to assist the Government in maintaining social order; (2) to ensure a steady food supply in the district; (3) to promote the economic prosperity of the district; (4) to transmit truthful information. This meant watching and reporting the movement of the radicals, securing information on their social and political backgrounds, patrolling the market streets at dusk, and disseminating government propaganda and rewards. They were in close liaison with the District Office and police department. One PSAA member boasted that the police instructed them in handling weapons, including automatic rifles and machine guns. However, only the head of the PSAA, Chin Siu-Siak, was officially authorized by the police to carry a revolver when his residence became a target for bombs. Chin was rarely seen on the streets of the town during that year of upheaval, and then only with his bodyguard and chauffeur, whose role recall was 'a thug from the local syndicate'.

On 10 November 1967, the Wen Wei Pao, a Hong Kong patriotic newspaper, published a 'New Territories Workers and Peasants War Bulletin':

The PSAs are formed by a motley crowd of pro-U.S. and pro-Chiang members of the local gentry, hooligans, racketeers and plunderers. During the past few months, members of the PSAs have done nothing beyond giving protection to opium and gambling dens . . .

This view of the PSAA was obviously different from the government's. The government conceded the possibility that PSAA members might be linked with the Kuomintang, but the government did everything it could to discourage at least the formal connections. In Sai Kung all of the PSAA executives, and many of the general members, had contacts with and memberships in Kuomintang agencies, Kuomintang-sponsored associations, secret societies, syndicates, and police. In most cases such
ties were more pecuniary than ideological. One PSAA executive
admitted that his colleague was a card-carrying member of the
Kuomintang, 'but only so long as he receives rice to eat'.
Still, there were men like the cousin of Lo Man-Yi, whose pro-
claimed loyalty was a matter of lineage tradition (see note 9).
However, on the eve of President Nixon's trip to Peking even he
spluttered that if Nixon would withdraw U.S. support from
Taiwan and Hong Kong he would join the Communists!

The executive and general members of the PSAA were middle-
aged and older male clients of Chin Siu-Siek. Most of their
occupational origins were not 'local gentry', as the patriotic
press alleged. Those born in Sai Kung had raised themselves
out of the grinding poverty of their native villages. Some of
the refugees had been 'gentry' in China, but suffered some
loss of occupational status in fleeing their native places for
Sai Kung. Their participation in the PSAA would ultimately
help their local mobility in Sai Kung market when Chin finally
obtained control. Six of the executives were merchants or busi-
nessmen in Sai Kung. Six of them made a living in a variety
of ways - they raised a few cows, received money from sons
working in England, gambled, speculated on small plots of land
or had part interest in small business concerns. The occupa-
tional categories of the PSAA official leadership were thus
similar to those of the Struggle Committee leaders. However,
the latter also included sub-organizations of workers, women
and youth.

What about the native place and speech group categories?
The PSAA executives were primarily local-born Hakka, but there
was a large important category (of non-local) Cantonese. Eight
were local, village-born Hakka, three were Waichow refugee
Hakka, and one was a Waichow Hokkien, who could speak Hakka,
although as we shall see, it was not necessary to speak Hakka
in the PSAA as it was necessary in the Struggle Committee.
Three were local village Cantonese, who spoke only a smattering
of Hakka. Five were Cantonese from areas in the Canton Delta,
who had lived in Sai Kung for two decades but spoke no Hakka.
Finally and crucially, the PSAA leadership was nearly equally
proportioned between outsiders and local-born.

The comparative proportions of native speech group identities
in the Struggle Committee leadership are almost the same. But
there are several relevant differences. While the PSAA leaders
were all born in the impoverished villages, a significant pro-
portion of the 'leftists' were born in Sai Kung town. The
circumstances of the upheaval caused them to shift their
domiciles: those born in town sought refuge in the villages and
those born in the villages were stucking close to town. Among
the radical leaders, half were born outside of the marketing
area (including the Hsin-hui wife of Chan Yat-Kuan). But by far

Leaders, Factions and Ethnicity

the most interesting difference was that all of the radicals,
regardless of their origins, spoke Hakka.

It is remarkable that those who claimed to be organizing
to uphold local custom and local interests included a sub-
stantial number of outsiders and leaders who could not speak
the dominant local language of Sai Kung. On the other hand,
the group that was organizing to promote the national
interests and customs of China were substantially local-born,
but its non-local members were all competent in the local
Hakka language.

The End of The Upheaval and Struggle for Leadership in
the PSAA

The Patriotic Press observed that 'these PSAA members are
torn by jealousy and internal strife.' We have seen that the
Struggle Committee was formed from the top down, by the estab-
lished leadership in Sai Kung market. Yet leadership
positions were notcoveted beyond the summer of 1967. Indeed,
beyond that date, leadership in the Struggle Committee in-
creasingly required non-adaptive, altruistic sacrifice.

On the other hand, the PSAA had to mobilize sentiment among
men who were struggling for positions of influence. They
lacked an ideological base. They could not mobilize support
on an empty appeal for loyalty to a British colony, nor could
they openly pledge loyalty to the Kuomintang. The only basis
for appeal was the traditional promise of living and shop
space in the market, financial connections and positions of
local prestige and power. Their struggle took place in the
context of three basic organizations, the PSAA, the Fellow-
ship Association and the Rural Committee. The PSAA was the right
hand of the Fellowship Association, the leaders of the PSAA
were in control of the Fellowship Association. It was this
faction that would ultimately be in a position to seat itself
in a new Rural Committee.

However, the old Rural Committee executive was not completely
defunct. Between June and November 1967, the Rural Committee
building in the market had been plastered with big character
posters and bombs. Few of the extant executives dared to set
foot in the building. By December the original enthusiasm of
the patriotic leadership was nearly spent. If anyone had
harboured a hope that Peking would actively engage its power in
the Hong Kong struggle, that hope was dashed on the cold rock
of reality in the winter of 1967-8.

Four of the original Struggle Committee members, who did not
take a very active part and were not dismissed by the govern-
ment, were ready to reactivate their positions in the Rural
Committee. Lo Man-Yi, the Second Vice-chairman, had retreated
 Blake

to his village; he had never joined the Struggle Committee nor had he joined the PSA. Another was the Cantonese villager, Wong Mo, an 'opportunistic' who one day had been Chan's close confidant and the next day joined the right-wing of the Fellowship Association. There was also the old Hakka ex-seaman, ex-guerrilla who retained his 'leftist' affiliations but lacked appreciation for the superficiality of the present struggle.

While Chan was in hiding and his First Vice-chairman was in Stanley Prison, Lo Man-Yi, the second Vice-chairman, called a meeting at the District Office in Kowloon. Both Cantonese villagers, Lo Man-Yi and Wong Mo, by virtue of their executive positions under Chan, became the acting Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively. Cantonese were at last in control of the Rural Committee, and this time they were local village Cantonese, and they made no pretence about being Hakka! This was a temporary situation, for the real power lay with Chin Siu-Siak, the Hakka villager.

In March 1968, the Rural Committee finally held its election for executive members. There were three factions. The West-end village Cantonese faction was led by Lo Man-Yi and Wong Mo. Even after an attempt to compromise they controlled only 21 votes. The second faction was ten 'leftists' from the poor Hakka villages east of town. Their leaders were scattered or incarcerated, and they played only small parts in the local upheaval. The largest faction was led by Chin and other village-born Hakka who had become merchants in town, and who had solid backing by outside urban financiers including the important Teochiu community. Chin and his colleagues had spent a decade organizing the Sai Kung Fellowship Association and then established their power in the PSA. They controlled 54 votes including those of the boat-people's representatives.

In the executive election, Chin Siu-Siak received 75 votes. Lo Man-Yi, who had helped Chan Yat-Kuan purge the Hakka villagers from the Chamber of Commerce and had never joined the PSA, managed to scrape by in last place on the executive Committee with 37 votes. Wong Mo, failed to win any votes at all! The new Rural Committee executive consisted of two Cantonese, one boatman and 18 Hakka!

The Teochiu Emergence in Sai Kung Society

Although Chin's Hakka faction now completely controlled Sai Kung, local people began to complain that the 'new' society had lost its traditional 'Hakka gall'. After 1967 the tempo of urbanization intensified as the Kowloon population began pressing on Sai Kung's empty spaces - first as a place for club, family and factory picnics, then as a place to live. The two-lane road winding from Kowloon to Sai Kung market became clogged with traffic on weekends and the quietude of Sai Kung's rural order shifted steadily into urban gear. Changes in building codes and zoning facilitated house construction on the fallow paddy, especially in the vicinity of the market.

Chin's succession had been accomplished by outside urban interests, the most visible being the Colonial Government and the Teochiu. The Teochiu were symbolic of this urban takeover, as their leader told me in our first interview. 'Wherever there are cities there are Teochiu people'. However, the Teochiu had an unsavoury reputation as aggressive syndicalists (See McCoy 1972; and Penn 1972). Thus, the most grievous blow to the rural Hakka hegemony was Chin's concession of the Chamber of Commerce to Teochiu leaders.

In July 1967, the Teochiu took advantage of the turmoil and petitioned the District Officer for legal recognition of their Sai Kung branch Teochiu Clansmen's Association (Ch'ao-chou T'ungbiang Hui). Their purpose was 'to achieve a better relationship among clansmen and to avoid some from being exploited by the agitators'. Coupled with their resolution supporting the government's move to maintain law and order, the petition received immediate approval in the beleaguered District Office. In his speech at the opening of the Association, the Teochiu leader proclaimed his alliance with Chin:

Chairman Chin is a farsighted local leader who is not only kind and honest but is also very zealous in extending help to others, and so all of us Teochiu people are well prepared to exert our best efforts, under his leadership, to work for our prosperity and build a new Sai Kung. From the beginning of the upheaval, the leader of the Teochiu community had thrown his considerable weight behind Chin. By January 1968, Chin was in a position to begin repaying such loyalty.

In the absence of Chan Yat-Kuan, Chin Siu-Siak took charge of the Chamber's affairs, and he orchestrated the selection of the Teochiu leader as the Chamber's new Executive Secretary. This 'extraordinary' move was noted by a Chinese liaison in the District Office:

People might be surprised that a Teochiu was elected the Executive Secretary. This was due to the remarkable public spirit of Chin Siu-Siak who ... persuaded the Hakka people to waive the thought of discriminating against other people.
Aside from the facade of benevolence, Chin was providing positions in the local status structure for people who could pay for them. The Chamber Executive Committee included eight Teochiu, five Hakka, three Cantonese and one boatman. Many local Hakka resented this Teochiu incursion. Every non-Teochiu shopkeeper questioned said the Chamber of Commerce had become useless since few people would take their problems to the Teochiu.

**Chin Organizes, Replaces the Dragon Boat Festival with the Hong Kong Festival**

Chin Siu-Siak was beholden to the Government in many ways. While Chan Yat-Kuan had expressed the highest regard for the town's patron deity, Tin Hau, Chin Siu-Siak appeared to disregard her. In 1972, the Government was filling in the harbour in front of the Tin Hau Temple - and trying to persuade the boat-people who were the backbone of local commerce to move away from the market! On top of the fill the Government was constructing resettlement houses. With barely a murmur, Chairman Chin complied with the Government's request that the matshed housing the opera for Tin Hau's birthday be moved from its traditional place in front of the Temple to make room for the housing. This was further fuel for many local complaints that Chin was a puppet for outside interests. Moving the matshed was symbolic of the larger move which Sai Kung people were making to provide space for the urban swell of outsiders.

People recalled also that while Chan was in control, Sai Kung was the site for the traditional Dragon Boat races on the Double-Five Festival. They said that since Chin's faction had taken over they were 'too cheap' to organize the races. Chin's faction argued that the festival was too expensive and the people were not willing to foot the bill for such extravagance. Yet in the very same year, Chin was constrained to support a government request to hold a Hong Kong Festival celebration in Sai Kung market. The Hong Kong Festival was instituted by the Colonial Government in the years following the 1967 disturbance as a means to celebrate Hong Kong's prosperity and to reassert the colony's credibility with foreign investors and resident workers alike. In Sai Kung Chin and his faction fellows worked closely with the Catholic Mission setting up displays and preparing programmes. They also collected contributions from their clients and constituencies to sponsor an operatic performance. Several of Chin's own faction fellows expressed great displeasure at having to collect money for what seemed to most people to be a meaningless if not pernicious celebration. Thus, while Chin had cut back on traditional ceremonial expenses, he had organized a 'foreign' festival at the government's behest.

**Leaders, Factions and Ethnicity**

Regarding Chin's leadership perhaps no comment was more poignant than a young Hakka's observation while listening to a public address by Chin Siu-Siak, 'He speaks Cantonese incorrectly!' This was extremely embarrassing for local people who were as sensitive to being regarded as 'country hicks' by outsiders as they were proud of their Hakka heritage among local folk. Chin's usage of Cantonese reflected his inadequacy as mediator of Sai Kung's face with the outside world.

**The Lee Faction (1968-1975): Renewal of Local and Imperial Balance**

It was inevitable that some of Chin's ambitious allies would exploit the local discontent. One of these, named Lee, along with two others formed a new faction. All three were originally from poor Hakka villages; but each was proud of his ability to speak Cantonese when needed. Lee's father had even sent his young son to live and attend school in the Cantonese village where Liao lived.

Lee was the principal owner of the largest restaurant in the market town. This became the centre for his anti-Chin activities. From there Lee formulated the now proven strategy of capturing the Fellowship Association, which had now gained the prestige and influence it lacked previous to the struggle of 1967. The Association's importance was enhanced when the District Officer quietly discontinued official recognition of the quavering, self-effacing PSA. (The PSA was never officially registered.) Furthermore, the District Officer provided a plot of Crown land and other support for the construction of a two-storey building to house the new offices of the Fellowship Association.

Lee and his colleagues spared no cost in mobilizing local villagers' support for the 1972 Fellowship Association election. Chin did not concede any power to this opposition which was proving itself extremely capable of treating the public to gala celebrations and gaining access to local resources, especially real estate. Chin even went so far as to interfere with the electoral process, but when Lee attempted to manipulate the election in his favour, Chin tried to have Lee arrested. Lee was called to the police station for a peace parley with Chin. That afternoon the big-men poured out of the town rushing on foot and in cars to the police station half a mile away. There Lee and Chin came face to face in a bitter confrontation, which if not for the presence of police would have resulted in violence. The dispute was ultimately adjudicated in the District Office, where the District Officer warned the protagonists that if they could not compromise, their Association would lose the support of the District Office.
In the negotiations between Lee and Chin, old Liao, the founder of the Association, was resurrected as a go-between. He bitterly remembered how in 1960 Chin and Ho had dropped him from the executive and although he was a symbol of compromise, he strongly supported Lee's claim to the executive position. Also the District Officer was reluctant to support Chin because of the latter's blatant attempt to manipulate the election in the first place. In the compromise, three new positions were created: First, Second and Third Association Heads (Hui-chang). Chin was invited to be the First Association Head; Liao and another of the original founders were made Second and Third Association Heads. Then Chin, as Association Head, called for a new election in which Lee, by previous agreement, won the position of Executive Secretary. The position of Association Head was purely honorary, and it was created for Chin so, as a member of the Lee faction said, 'Chin would not lose too much face when he lost the election'. The compromise of 1972 painted a neat new face over the factionalism in the Fellowship Association.

Having succeeded to the leading positions of the Fellowship Association, Lee and his cronies set their sights on the Rural Committee election of 1974. Immediately they put together the largest extravaganza for an inauguration ever witnessed in the little town. The installation ceremonies were attended by reporters, Colonial officials and other Chinese leaders in the New Territories. A sumptuous feast followed in Lee's restaurant, and throughout the following year, every festive occasion was used to fête local leaders and enlarge the faction. The momentum from their victory in the Fellowship Association coupled with the gracious Chinese custom of spreading the wealth carried Lee on to win the Rural Committee election of 1974. This was the first election in Sai Kung history in which the incumbent and his faction were voted out of office. The two previous chairmen, Chin Fuk-Loi and Chan Yat-Kuan had 'ever represented' local Chinese interests and had been dismissed by the Colonial Government.

Chin Fuk-Loi was now an old man who spent most of his days sitting in the sun just outside his herb shop. Chan Yat-Kuan, now middle-aged, kept to his commercial farm on the outskirts of town where he minded his business connections in Kowloon. The order for his arrest was withdrawn as the Hong Kong Authorities ended their crackdown and Peking dampened the Cultural Revolution. The failure of Sai Kung's patriotic leaders in 1967 had caused them a loss of face; not only were they blacklisted by the Colonial Government but were criticized by Chinese cadres. Nevertheless, in some sense their failure at the local level was ameliorated by Mao Tse-Tung's success on the national and international levels. Part of the compromise worked out among Peking, London and Hong Kong was the allowance of peaceful patriotic organization in the Colony.

Thus the post-1967 organization of Sai Kung also included a substantial, though by definition powerless, patriotic establishment. From the Struggle Committee emerged a Peasant Husbandman and Worker Association (Nung Nu Kung Hui). This association with several thousand nominal members set up a food-cooperative and a primary school, a branch of the old left-wing Chung-Yah Middle School in Kowloon. It also supported a football team and a Sai Kung Village Women's Improvement Association (Tuen Fu-nu Lien-ji Hui). None of these existed before 1967.

Given the international arena, we can view the 1974 succession of the Lee faction as a readjustment of the local patriotic interests and the Chin faction which was so closely wedded to outside and foreign interests. The Lee faction represented a new attempt to articulate the delicate balance between the imperial and local spheres of interest in the context of a British colony on Chinese Communist soil.

Summary and Analysis

Factionalism increased in Sai Kung when the lineage-village based organization was unable to accommodate the new realities brought about by outside administrative and commercial involvement. From the village level, factionalism had a destructive impact. But when we shift our attention to the market town, we can see that it had adaptive value. There, leaders competed with each other in mediating the intensifying interaction between the local market microcosm and the imperial macrocosms. Their competition involved the mobilization of factions which led to attempts to institutionalize personal influence or 'benevolence' into a more 'permanent structure' of 'voluntary associations'.

Three criteria for successful leadership emerged out of this interaction between the local market microcosm and the imperial macrocosms. First, leaders had to have a base in local political power. Where no single agmatic aggregate held electoral power - as defined by the rules of the Rural Committee - the aggregate Hakk showed. Leaders were constrained to identify Hakk interests which were wrapped in language usage, local festivities and traditions of resistance. Interestingly, it did not require a native Hakk to articulate Hakk identity. In fact, a Cantonese merchant, Chan Yat-Kuan, was extra-ordinarily effective in identifying Hakk interests. Being Cantonese also helped in two other ways: In so far as the Hakk enclave of Sai Kung existed in the Cantonese arena, it was
beneficial to have a leader competent in Cantonese representing the local society to the outside world. Also, at the level of local Cantonese villagers (a minority in the Hakka enclave) Chan's native identity helped to solidify the local alliance between Hakka and Cantonese villagers. This local alliance between traditional opponents became increasingly important as outsiders began to encroach on Sai Kung's resources. However, outsiders, especially Teochiu clanmen, also provided a source of (monetary) power by which they were able to exert their influence on the local factions.

This brings me to the second base of factional success. The leader had to have a base in commercial power. This was especially true in a capitalist system such as Hong Kong where commerce is the measure of power. The leader had to be able to articulate the resources of Sai Kung (its migrant labour, commercial land, fish and vegetable producers and luxury consumers) with the even more powerful outside interests seeking influence on the local level. Such outside interests included the massive economic infrastructure of the Chinese national establishment, various Western cartels, the powerful Teochiu clan, international syndicates and the Kuomintang-oriented conglomerates.

Thirdly, the leader had to be politically acceptable to the Hong Kong government in terms of support for the security of the colonial establishment. Each of the successive leaders specialized in certain alliances or affiliations which maximized his control over the rapidly changing environment. Chin Fuk-Loi, as a local leader in the regional trades, fulfilled the first two requirements. He allied his native Hakka with Cantonese by affiliating with Chan Yat-Kuan on the basis of a written surname. But Chin's speciality in covering international guerrilla operations and racketeering, by maintaining tight local alliances, undermined the trust of his Hakka language, support for the Communist veterans, regarding local festivals which clearly defined the boundary between Chinese and British. Chan linked these local interests to the power of the China state establishment in urban Hong Kong. This substantiated his partisan patronage as it provided him and his clientele with access to a wide range of goods and services. But in so doing Chan was obliged to do the Chinese establishment's bidding on the local level.

when in 1967 it organized opposition to the Hong Kong government. Chan chose to retain his patriotic affiliations, and he was dismissed from office by the colonial government.

Chin Siu-Siak came from the same impoverished Hakka hamlet as his uncle, Fuk-Loi. Following somewhat in his uncle's footsteps, Siu-Siak established himself in the regional circles of smuggling, and was naturally attracted to the international connections of the Teochiu. Possessing native Hakka credentials, Chin maximized the political and financial support from much outsiders seeking influence in Sai Kung could provide. This included the locally despised Teochiu after 1960 and the Hong Kong government in 1967. To obtain this support he not only intensified his traditional enmity with the Cantonese villagers over Teochiu and Kuomintang patronage but in the process sacrificed local Hakka connections. His local-level alliances were extremely brittle. As the remnants of Chan's patriotic faction withdrew their aspirations from the Hong Kong game of politics and prestige after 1967, Lee and other Hakka broke from Chin to fill the vacuum of local interest articulation. Chin violated the first rule for success and was voted out of office.

Each leader adapted himself to the changing environment by mobilizing alliances and affiliating with identities which were not part of his native repertoire. As the environment changed through the intensifying interaction of microcosm and macrocosm, these specialized alliances and affiliations became political liabilities. F.G. Bailey has used this evolutionary or maturational analogy in describing the adaptive value of factions:

The leaders who prove most skilled at exploiting the new resources pay the biggest dividends and attract the ablest followers: The fittest survive, the fittest being those best adapted to the new environment (Bailey 1969:53).

The second way that the succession of factions can be seen as adaptive or 'maturational' is the way they incorporated a number of collective interests. Out of the organized conflict emerged a skeleton of 'voluntary associations' cleaved along lines of collective identities - villagers, shopkeepers, fishermen, Communist partisans ('patriots'), Kuomintang loyalists and Teochiu clanmen. However, these institutions continued to provide points of leverage in the factional fights for overall control. The fights were largely over the best ways to protect local interests and to accommodate outside interests; and these 'voluntary associations' constituted an interface by which these divergent interests could be mediated. As the arena continued to undergo rapid and penetrating change, the factions and their infant institutions
were pawns of political manipulators. This was especially obvious in the cases of the Fellowship Association and Chamber of Commerce. I suspect that once the massive penetration of the local system is accomplished, these new institutions will provide a basis for greater stability as they have in older overseas 'Chinatowns' and also a basis for describing the 'structure' of the Sai Kung community.

In this chronicle of the Sai Kung urban organization, I stressed the factional machinations by which a Chinese community adapted itself to the arena of imperial control, commercialization and international conflicts. The network of 'voluntary associations' which compose 'Chinatowns' around the world are famous as 'mechanisms' of community stability and mutual aid. However, their 'benevolent function' should also be considered as a means by which leaders mediated local and imperial interests in the scramble for political-economic spoil.

NOTES

1 Between 1971 and 1973 I lived in Sai Kung Market where I conducted anthropological research on the sociocultural relationships among Chinese who speak different languages. The data for this paper was gathered mostly through formal and informal interviews with the townsfolk and villagers. A second important source of information was the Sai Kung District Office where I was allowed access to unclassified documents. Most of the names of the characters in this chronicle have been changed. Local names are romanized according to their Cantonese or Hakka sounds and according to the way they are rendered in Hong Kong English publications. Other Chinese words are italicized and rendered in Mandarin according to Wade-Giles.

2 Cantonese (or 'Punti') is one of the speech group identities important to this study. Cantonese is dialectically heterogeneous, and its standard form is centred on Canton and Hong Kong. Another important language group is the Hakka which seems to be the most homogeneous of all the south-eastern Chinese languages. Hakka is the only one not centred on a major seaport but rather on Tai Mei Tsai (county) in the eastern hills of Kwangtung Province. There, according to Lo Hsiang-lun (1933), the Hakka settled during the Hung dynasty. Then, in the last century they spread into western Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Taiwan provinces which resulted in the intermixture conflict with the Cantonese and Min-speaking inhabitants, respectively. The third language group is the Min of Fukien Province which is dialectically heterogeneous. In Sai Kung the Min-speakers are subdivided between the Hokkien (Fukien or Hoklo) and the Teochiu (or Chiucho). The Teochiu speak a dialect derived from several of the nine counties around the port of Swatow in east Kwangtung. The Hokkien speak dialects derived from the vicinity of the port of Amoy in south Fukien. Another set of ethnic identities in Sai Kung society include features of occupation and domicile on boats. Because of their non-settled, non-agrarian mode of subsistence boat-people have been relegated to a despised outcaste position in traditional Chinese society. The two groups of boat-people in Sai Kung are the 'Tanks', boat-people speaking a dialect of Cantonese, and the 'Hoklo', boat-people speaking a dialect of Hokkien. Although Cantonese-speaking boat-people ('Tanks') are linguistically and culturally Chinese (see Ward 1963), the Cantonese peasant is just as quick to deny them ('Tanks') the Chinese edness as they are to deny the Hakka - or the Hakka to deny the Cantonese and Hokkien - or the Hokkien to deny the Hakka and Cantonese. These language groups are as distinct from one another as are the Latin languages such as French, Italian and Spanish. However, objectively, they are all equally Chinese since they are all derived from the same historical roots.

3 The first Catholic missionary arrived in Sai Kung market in 1865. According to T.F. Ryan (1959:44), 'No one had recommended this place [to Father Origio], for it had a bad reputation as a resort for pirates . . . The people had availed of the opportunity for generations, and they almost had piracy as their regular occupation. When 'off duty' however, they passed as ordinary fishermen and farmers, and no one in Hong Kong trusted anyone in the district. Father Origio, nevertheless . . . got the most friendly reception that he had yet received anywhere. Many persons, and soon whole villages, declared themselves ready to accept Christianity. They admitted their past quite openly and said they were determined to change their lives.'

4 Thus, the Chln-Chan alliance fulfilled the essential requirements of Maurice Freedman's definition of a 'lineage': A claim of common ancestry incorporated in a common estate. Freedman discussed this possibility in terms of how a relationship based on a common surname could be temporarily condensed into lineage bonds. See Freedman 1966:21.

5 Demographic data for Sai Kung were obtained in most cases from Hong Kong Government censuses of 1911 (in Sessional
Notes to Chapter 3


6 'Collaborator' is a term relative to 'guerrilla'. Though Liao was responsible for distributing Japanese rice stores to bona fide locals, he was also under the guerrilla gun to provide ration tickets to guerrilla infiltrators.


9 The Lo lineage is an example of how an agnatic organisation may not factionalize in the modernization process. Rather the association redefines itself by keeping its outer form (of agnatic relationships) and adapting its substantive principles of recruitment and action to the new environment. For the Los, political loyalty is as important as agnation and genealogy. In fact, of the lineage members, only Lo Man-Yi keeps an old worm-eaten copy of a chia-p'u (household genealogical register). Another branch leader told me that even in his father's day they no longer possessed a genealogy (for their branch). Instead, the father kept a Chung Wo Tong ('Triad') hand-book which they were taught to revere more than genealogy. This informant went on to boast how the Lo lineage had been loyal to the Kuomintang for three hundred years! Undoubtedly, this was a reference to the Anti-Manchurian resistance which is so much a part of the 'Triad' tradition. In any case, the Lo lineage is at the head of a significant faction in Sai Kung politics, and their association is both a lineage and a faction.

10 The 'causes' for the Hong Kong upheaval may be considered in two broad categories: First is the ever-present grievance on the part of industrial workers. Second is the increasingly serious grievance on the part of students, especially at the secondary level. The hierarchy of 'Examination Hells' beginning in pre-schools is as traumatic as it is in Japan, while the relevance of education in Hong Kong is comparatively lacking. This education grievance was as important in Sai Kung as in the urban areas. However, the industrial workers in Sai Kung were mostly males engaged in cottage labour while the local menfolk laboured overseas. For a very adequate depiction of life in urban Hong Kong, see Hopkins 1971.

11 This was the largest aggregate of rural representatives to join a struggle committee in the whole of the New Territories. In the other townships only an average of four per cent of the representatives broke with the government. In Sai Kung, it was thirteen per cent. See Catron, 1971. (unpubl.)

12 Throughout the period of upheaval, the official Patriotic Line continued to be an end to British 'fascist methods' of control. At no time was the official line the overthrow of British authority in the Colony. However, among the most active circles of local youth this distinction was not clearly maintained, much less appreciated.

13 The Struggle Committee sustained its activities by funds sent from relatives and sympathizers working in Europe. The usual way of returning money to relatives in Hong Kong was through bank and postal orders. Between 1964 and 1966 the returns for Sai Kung had grown from an annual U.S. $672,050 to $845,366. But in 1967 the returns dropped below those of 1964 to a low of $655,811; and the total for 1968 was almost $30,000 less than for the previous year. (By 1972, the returns had risen to one million dollars.) The 1968 fluctuations appear more severe for Sai Kung than in other parts of the New Territories. On the one hand, they indicate that overseas residents were reluctant to return money to their homes in Sai Kung for investment there. On the other hand, they also indicate that many of those in Europe who supported the rebellion did not want to send their money through the British postal service for security reasons. Instead they carried their money on their persons from Europe to Sai Kung. For example in one case, a fund of £2,000 had been collected in London for the purpose of building new classrooms for the Kaifong school when the Hong Kong Department of Education had refused to finance the project. But in July 1967, the Kaifong school principal became the first person in Sai Kung to be arrested under the Emergency Act, and later that autumn, the £2,000 were carried from London to Sai Kung by a group of local men to contribute to the Struggle Committee.

14 For example, in October 1967, four students in the Catholic Middle School were arrested for lighting fire-crackers and leafleting during a formal assembly. They were sentenced to between eight months and a year in prison.

15 There is no official Hong Kong Government tabulation of the casualties of the 1967 Disturbances. In fact there was no official inquiry or report. The Government's case was
presented unofficially by J. Cooper (1970). The only official Patriotic account was published in October 1967 at the peak of the Upheaval. On pages 134-6 (The May Upheaval . . . 1967) is a list of twenty-one 'Patriots Who Achieved Martyrdom' by being shot or beaten to death by the Hong Kong police. Suffice that these and other deaths of Chinese and police occurred in urban Kowloon and Hong Kong, and none, to my knowledge, occurred in Sai Kung.

16 For example, one group that provided liaison and gave support to Chin were non-native ex-Kuomintang functionaries. After Chin secured control of the town, he helped this group of older men to establish a branch of the Sun Yat-Sen Memorial Association (Sun Chung-shan Chi-nien Hui) in the garret of the Chin faction restaurant. Chin did not join the association since it was only unofficially tolerated by the Government, and the Government would have taken exception to Chin's membership. In 1972, the Association's public activities consisted of celebrating Double Ten and other KMT anniversaries in the market town.


18 A few weeks after the Struggle Committee was formed, the Government-sponsored PSAA was created. Wong Mo signalled his break with the Struggle Committee by retreating to his village where he raised the Republican Flag of the Kuomintang. He then invited the District Officer to inspect his village. On the morning of the inspection, the District Officer is reported to have been greatly annoyed with Wong Mo's symbolic spectacle, as the flag was quickly removed. Wong's support for Chan had been an expedient to oppose Chin. For Wong and Chin each owned one of the two travel agencies in the town, and they were in direct and bitter competition for the lucrative market in 'international travel'.

19 I have not complicated the picture with an account of the boat-people's role in the upheaval. Suffice it to say that they took no active part. Many of the Cantonese boat-people felt personally attached to Chan Yat-Kuen's political patronage and to his father's, uncle's and brother's economic patronage, but they could not themselves take sides in the upheaval. Because of their precarious niche in the waters between Colonial Hong Kong and the People's Republic, the boat-people must live by the rule that when in Hong Kong play the Hong Kong game and when in China - Sai Kung boat-people are also members of Yen-t'ien.

Commune, sixteen miles north of Sai Kung - play the Communist game. There is even some evidence that during the upheaval, Chinese cadres told the boat-people they could support the Hong Kong Government in order to keep from being harassed by the Hong Kong police. The Cantonese boat-people in Sai Kung are nominally patriotic and are dutiful and more than a little proud to fly the Five-Star flag on October First.

The Hokkien boat-people are among the poorest people in Sai Kung. They only catch small fish along the shores of the colony, and cannot engage in the large-scale fresh-fish marketing of the Cantonese boat-people. Even their small catches are not enough for subsistence, and many of the Hokkien boat-people in Sai Kung were tied to the bottom of the U.S. and Kuomintang sponsored-aid funnels, and are nominally Kuomintang partisans.

